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The IPO process is a way for companies to improve their corporate governance
and for investors to assess company quality. This paper posits that investor
choices vary with diﬀerences in investment ability and experience. Three
groups of investors with large holdings, namely individual investors, blue-
chip institutional investors and underperforming institutional investors, are
compared by their use of three types of corporate governance information:
board characteristics, equity structure and aﬃliated relationships. Overall,
institutional investors make greater use of corporate governance information
than individual investors, with blue-chip institutional investors making the
greatest use. Further, bull-bear markets exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
behavior of both individual and underperforming institutional investors. These
results enrich the IPO literature and contribute to optimal social fund alloca-
tion in the stock market.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Although the mispricing of new shares is diminishing with the evolution of China’s initial public oﬀering
(IPO) supervisory policy, the investment behavior induced by the new share concept remains the subject of
considerable research interest. The IPO process not only improves corporate governance, but also provides
investors with information on company quality. IPO ﬁrms have to provide the public with a large amount
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rate governance information required is objective, and thus diﬃcult to manipulate. It also serves to guarantee
the reliability of other information. Here, we focus on two main questions. Are there any diﬀerences in the
degree of information absorption among diﬀerent types of investors during new share selection? Does the mar-
ket sentiment caused by the bull-bear market cycle aﬀect investors’ information absorption? This paper
reports the results of an empirical investigation of these questions using data on the corporation governance
information of IPO ﬁrms and investor behavior in China.
Historical experience in developed capital markets suggests that institutional investors, who are the main
driving force behind the marketization of the global ﬁnancial system, play a positive role in ex ante stock selec-
tion and ex post supervision by virtue of their economies of scale and professional advantages. The prior lit-
erature focuses primarily on the economic consequences of the participation of certain types of investors,
institutional investors in particular, largely ignoring the subject of stock selection, IPO stock selection in par-
ticular. Although institutional investors can take part in corporate governance by voting with their feet,
engaging in public opposition or private lobbying and/or exposing management entrenchment (Gillan and
Starks, 2003), these eﬀorts are costly and may ultimately be in vain. In fact, governance-sensitive institutional
investors display a preference for ﬁrms with sound internal governance (Bushee et al., 2014). Therefore, we
believe that competent, experienced investors are likelier to select rather than forgo quality stocks.
This paper contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it enriches the literature on new share selection.
It reports the ﬁrst systematic study investigating whether diﬀerent types of investors make diﬀerent uses of the
governance information disclosed in preliminary prospectuses and listing announcements when bulk-buying a
target corporation. Few studies in China have focused on how the corporation governance mechanism aﬀects
the new share selection decisions of institutional investors or even examined institutional investor behavior in
such selection. The likely reasons for this research gap are the diﬃculties in the information acquisition and
application processes and the inability to draw conclusions concerning IPO issues from Western studies on
stock selection strategies that use such ﬁnancial indicators as the growth rate of operating revenue and the
P/B ratio. When investors lack relevant historical performance information, it is wise to focus on corporate
governance information. The empirical evidence also shows that distinguishing worthy from worthless stocks
with reference to such information improves the eﬃciency of new share selection, thus implying that the gov-
ernment should place greater emphasis on standardizing and supervising the disclosure of governance infor-
mation by IPO ﬁrms and carry out audits of their prospectuses and listing announcements.
Second, the paper reﬁnes the quantiﬁcation of corporate governance information in the IPO context. One
challenge in comprehensively examining the use of such information by investors making new share selection
decisions is the selection of indicators. In consideration of the availability of governance information and the
quantiﬁability of indicators, we choose board characteristics, ownership characteristics, aﬃliated relationships
and auditing position to represent internal and external governance, and hence to describe ﬁrms’ governance
situation at the time of their IPOs. In addition, we also adopt the methods of principal component analysis
(PCA) and categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA), which take information quantity as a weight,
to extract dummy-variable principal components and continuous-variable principal components from our
nine corporate governance variables. This method of extracting classiﬁed principal components is suitable
for studies on corporate governance, and can be extended to sequential studies.
Third, the paper reclassiﬁes investors based on historical investment performance and overweighting expe-
rience. Most studies classify investors as individual investors or institutional investors and then further classify
the latter by economic laws and regulations. To avoid bias from mindless investors, we focus on the informa-
tion processing of investors with large holdings, who can be assumed to be professional and capable. In addi-
tion, as noted, we classify investors by historical investment performance and overweighting experience rather
than by economic laws and regulations. This approach allows us to identify diﬀerences in the information
absorption of diﬀerent types of investors, thus rendering the study more pertinent than others. We demon-
strate that institutional investors with excellent historical investment performance and rich overweighting
experience pay greater attention to the governance situation in IPO ﬁrms than other investors.
Finally, the paper investigates the moderating eﬀect of market sentiment on new share selection. More
speciﬁcally, it examines whether investors’ new share selection strategies are inﬂuenced by the bull-bear market
cycle. We divide our sample into two groups based on the market circumstances at the time of ﬁrms’ IPOs, and
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with large holdings. Relative to their individual counterparts, institutional investors are unperturbed by mar-
ket sentiment and capable of using governance information eﬀectively in a bull market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the domestic and overseas literatures
and proposes the study’s hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the research design, including data selection and
research methods. Section 4 outlines and discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 reports the results of
additional analysis using other classiﬁcation approaches for investors with large holdings. Section 6 concludes
the paper with a discussion of the research implications.
2. Literature review and research hypotheses
2.1. Corporate governance information and diﬀerences in new stock subscription decisions among heterogeneous
investors with large holdings
Corporate governance information allows investors to determine company quality (Shleifer and Vishny,
1986). A high-quality external corporate governance environment can reduce listed ﬁrms’ operating risks
and improve their ability to deal with crises. This corporate governance premium ensures that companies
operate smoothly over the long term, and ultimately results in high returns for investors. Accordingly, insti-
tutional investors tend to favor companies with good corporate governance (Falkenstein, 1996; Eakins et al.,
1998; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Xin and Xu, 2007; Song and Li, 2009; Li and Li, 2008; Ye et al., 2009). It
can thus be concluded that corporate governance aﬀects both the value of IPO ﬁrms and the interests of inves-
tors. Investors with large holdings are constrained by limited ﬁnancial resources and strong proﬁt pressure.
Therefore, their investment decisions tend to be relatively cautious. Under pressure to gain a proﬁt, they
dig out as much information as possible to determine whether a new stock is really a black horse and to pro-
tect their own interests, paying particularly close attention to the ﬁrm’s corporate governance information.
The better the governance structure of an IPO ﬁrm, the larger institutional investors’ holdings in it are likely
to be because these investors are good at making use of information. However, investors are heterogeneous,
and their degree of sensitivity to corporate governance information also diﬀers. Hence, we investigate the dif-
ferences in the strategies of diﬀerent groups of investors with large holdings, namely institutional investors and
individual investors, when they make new stock subscription decisions.
Securities investments account for only a small proportion of individual investors’ portfolios. These inves-
tors also struggle with complex operations such as short selling. Therefore, in the face of numerous investment
possibilities, individual investors are prone to the ‘‘search problem.” Kumar and Lee (2006) ﬁnd little variety
in the securities in which individual investors invest and a high degree of correlation in their investment behav-
ior. In addition, individual investors display obvious myopia, often making investment decisions on the basis
of past price change patterns. Field and Lowry (2009) show that individual investors generally ignore infor-
mation on the characteristics of IPO companies in their decision-making process and do not even consider
those companies’ pre-IPO earnings conditions. In addition, they ﬁnd that a considerable proportion of such
investors make large investments in IPO companies with poor ﬁnancial performance. Individual investors are
also more easily aﬀected by hearsay and tend toward impulse investments, showing themselves to be behav-
iorally motivated (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Barber and Odean (2004) ﬁnd that many individual investors
are net buyers of ‘‘eye-catching” stocks, that is, those with a news media focus, high turnover rate or high daily
returns. In summary, individual investors depend on noise in making transaction decisions, and ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to make full use of corporate governance information on IPO ﬁrms.
Institutional investors clearly have a number of advantages over individual investors, including teamwork,
knowledge accumulation and practical experience. They are better able to judge market conditions and iden-
tify high-quality stocks, and hence are likelier to achieve returns higher than the market average (Grinblatt
and Titman, 1989, 1992; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 2000). Institutional investors have been found
to identify ﬁrms that beat market benchmarks over a one-quarter horizon and to avoid ﬁrms that exhibit poor
performance over the long run (Field and Lowry, 2009), and thus to have a strong ability to screen companies
at the IPO stage. Using a dataset of bid information on every IPO auction in Taiwan from 1995 to 2000,
Chiang et al. (2012) ﬁnd that the bids of institutional investors are relatively consistent with those of informed
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tutional investors are also more diverse than those of individual investors, and they are more adept at using
the short-selling strategy proﬁtably (Barber and Odean, 2008). Therefore, institutional investors create more
portfolios in the process of subscribing to IPOs. Although public information is the main information source
tapped by institutional investors, these investors have a stronger motivation than their individual counterparts
to dig for additional information under the dual pressure of supervision and agency costs. They are thus choo-
sier when selecting securities, and keep a vigilant eye on corporate governance information (Giannetti and
Simonov, 2006; Russell Reynolds Associates, 1998; Chiu and Monin, 2003; Schnatterly and Johnson, 2014;
Li et al., 2015).
To sum up, compared with individual investors, institutional investors have advantages in knowledge and
capital reserves, information processing and industry specialization, among other advantages. They are good
at exploiting the governance information publicly disclosed by IPO companies, and adjust their investment
portfolios using a discretionary approach. These investors can also bear a higher level of investment volatility
than their individual counterparts. Therefore, we believe that institutional investors have advantages in the use
of public information on IPO ﬁrms, and thus put forward Hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis 1a. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors with large holdings pay more
attention to the corporate governance conditions of IPO ﬁrms when subscribing to new stocks.
Although there is a clear boundary between individual and institutional investors, a large degree of hetero-
geneity exists within the latter group. Because there is a lack of historical transaction data for IPO stocks,
investors’ decisions about whether to buy them can be based only on the publicly disclosed information in
their prospectuses. Accordingly, we believe that diﬀerent types of institutional investors have diﬀering degrees
of ability to grasp governance information on IPO ﬁrms. Del Guerciu (1996), Bushee and Noe (2000) and
Bushee et al. (2014) all posit that due to signiﬁcant variations in information sources, data analysis, profes-
sional knowledge and investment experience among institutional investors, their sensitivity to and utilization
of corporate governance information also diﬀer. Therefore, we divide institutional investors into two groups,
blue-chip investors and underperforming investors, based on their historical investment ability and experience.
The historical investment performance of investors has some predictive power for future performance
(Fung and Hsieh, 2000). Blue-chip institutions achieved higher than market average returns in the past, which
suggests that they have the ability to select high-quality stocks. In the process of forming their own investment
style, institutional investors also acquire information interpretation and application skills that give them the
ability to grasp a comprehensive body of information. They also subject IPO companies to quality screening.
Therefore, we believe that among investors with large new stock holdings, those whose historical performance
is good (blue-chip institutional investors) have a stronger motivation and ability to make use of corporate gov-
ernance information on IPO corporations than those whose historical performance is poor (underperforming
institutional investors), which leads us to propose Hypothesis 1b.
Hypothesis 1b. Institutional investors with good rather than poor historical performance pay more attention
to corporate governance information on IPO companies before making a large investment.2.2. Moderating eﬀects of bull-bear cycle on new stock subscription strategies of investors with large holdings
Diﬀerent external market environments lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in investors’ decision-making behav-
ior. Daniel et al. (1998) construct a theoretical model of cognitive and emotional bias based on the behavioral
pricing context. Bagozzi et al. (1999) and Statman et al. (2003) ﬁnd that rising market sentiment prompts some
investors to assess future securities performance in an overly optimistic fashion and to have conﬁdence in their
predictive ability concerning securities. Using Chinese data, You (2010) shows that the market is likely to1 In price bids for IPO ﬁrms, institutional investors’ information superiority allows them to win at a relatively low price, and their bids
are generally consistent with IPO auction theory. In contrast, the information inferiority of individual investors means that they generally
overbid, and hence their bids diﬀer from those predicted by auction theory. As a matter of fact, returns are higher when more institutional
investors take part in the auction.
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size the importance of investor heterogeneity. Although all types of investors display behavioral bias, the
extent to which they do so diﬀers. In China’s securities market, individual investors are more sensitive to mar-
ket sentiment than institutional investors, and tend to buy securities in a herd when such sentiment is positive
(Li et al., 2015). The pattern of new stock subscription decisions is similarly aﬀected by the external market
environment.
During the up phase of a composite index, a highly speculative atmosphere is likely to make some investors
overly optimistic, thereby dampening demand for information on new shares. In this situation, the motiva-
tions of both individual and underperforming institutional investors to use corporate governance information
are likely to weaken. Mature investors, in contrast, are more capable of maintaining a stable investment style
and identifying potential investment targets calmly and objectively in the up phase of a stock index. Therefore,
during bull market periods, the ability of individual and underperforming institutional investors to interpret
IPO governance information is reduced, whereas that of their blue-chip counterparts holds steady.
In the down phase of a composite index, in contrast, the resulting stock market recession forces investors to
be more cautious in their selection. Individual investors and blue-chip and underperforming institutional
investors alike are forced to exploit the investment signals contained in corporate governance information
due to the smaller proﬁt space. Therefore, in these circumstances, the motivations of both individual and
underperforming institutional investors to make use of corporate governance information are enhanced.
To summarize, the bull-bear market cycle is an important factor in investors’ new stock subscription behav-
ior. An external environment characterized by a composite index in an up phase weakens the ability of less
sophisticated investors (individual investors and underperforming institutional investors) to make use of cor-
porate governance information on IPO ﬁrms. This discussion brings us to our ﬁnal hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a. Compared with institutional investors, individual investors’ motivation and ability to make
use of corporate governance information on IPO companies is weakened during the up phase of a composite
index.
Hypothesis 2b. Compared with blue-chip institutional investors, underperforming institutional investors’
motivation and ability to make use of corporate governance information on IPO companies is weakened dur-
ing the up phase of a composite index.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
To investigate how the corporate governance of IPO companies inﬂuences the new stock subscription deci-
sions of diﬀerent types of investors, we collect corporate governance data on all Chinese IPO companies listed
between 20 May 2002 (when the market value allotment system started in full) and 31 December 2014. The
sample is then divided into stages based on the IPO bull-bear market cycle. The sample is also cleaned as fol-
lows. First, observations with incomplete information disclosure, such as a lack of ﬁnancial information for
the three years before the listing date, market information on new shares and corporate governance informa-
tion, are excluded. Second, the agent variables are calculated according to the original data; that is, extreme
values are winsorized at 1%. Investor information is collected from the ﬁrst post-listing quarterly reports of the
sample IPO ﬁrms, and corporate governance information is collected manually from IPO prospectuses and
listed company statements. Data on the control variables are collected from the CSMAR, RESSET and
CNINFO databases, and information on underwriter reputation from the oﬃcial Web site of the China Secu-
rities Industry Association (CSIA). All data are double-checked for discrepancies. After data-processing, the
ﬁnal sample includes 1516 observations.
Fig. 1 shows the time series of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Indexes, which are further divided
into up and down periods in Appendix A in accordance with the Elliott Wave Principle. The Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock markets experienced 10 up cycles and nine down cycles between May 2002 and December
2014. The cycles in both directions lasted from one month to approximately two years, although the average
Figure 1. External investment environment at the time of new stock listings (time series of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite
Indexes).
288 Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 283–304cycle is about 251 days. More importantly, the distribution of new stocks in the overall bull-bear cycle
depicted in Fig. 1 shows, in general, that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distributions of the 1516 sample
IPO ﬁrms in bull and bear periods.
3.2. Independent variable: division of investor heterogeneity
Most scholars distinguish between diﬀerent types of institutional investors by economic laws and regula-
tions, although institutional investors’ aﬃliated background and investment style are increasingly being taken
into consideration. However, the heterogeneity of these investors is rarely considered from the perspective of
large-holding experience. Yang et al. (2012) conclude that most researchers are concerned purely with the
study of securities investment funds, with only a few studies comparing such funds with securities companies
or social insurance funds, a few comparing them with securities companies and the Qualiﬁed Foreign Institu-
tional Investor (QFII) scheme, and a few comparing securities investment funds, securities companies, the
QFII scheme and trust companies. We argue that these classiﬁcations are inadequate. Because IPO stock sub-
scription decisions have a strong degree of speciﬁcity, and the experience of institutional investors diverges
widely (Bushee et al., 2014), it is necessary to make a more meaningful division of the institutional investor
group.
To measure the investment capacity of institutional investors, we reclassify those who buy large holdings in
new stocks. Based on their past investment performance, we divide institutional investors into blue-chip and
underperforming investors and carry out a comparative study of the two using rational factors to reﬂect their
institutional experience and ability. Distinguishing the investment ability of heterogeneous institutional inves-
tors who subscribe to new stocks allows us to characterize, for example, the age of the institution, historical
investment return pattern and historical number of investments. However, because the eﬀect of institutional
age is diﬃcult to distinguish, it is not considered in this study. Historical investment returns reﬂect past invest-
ment performance, which is used as a classiﬁcation criterion in our main model. The historical number of
investments reﬂects the investment experience of institutional investors, and it is thus used as the classiﬁcation
criterion in our extended analysis.
Gillan and Starks (2000) posit that the shareholding ratio reﬂects investors’ degree of participation. We ﬁrst
divide investors into institutional and individual investors, whose shareholdings are noted as P_INST and
P_INDI, respectively, and then further divide institutional investors by their investment performance in the
previous year. The shareholding ratios of blue-chip and underperforming institutional investors are noted
as P_WINNER and P_LOSER, respectively.
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governance information, which results in diﬀering patterns of new stock subscription behavior. Owing to the
limited resources available in the process of competing for new stocks, investors necessarily shoot their arrows
at the target to gain higher returns.2 Investors who invest heavily in new stocks put a lot of money into par-
ticular IPO corporations, resulting in a huge degree of proﬁt pressure. Then, by making use of their investment
experience and analytical capacity, these investors have a strong motivation to dig out hidden content in the
information they collect to identify the best new stocks. We believe that under the three drivers of experience,
ability and pressure, heavily investing investors can exploit various types of information to capture the details
hidden therein3 to maximize their proﬁts and purchase new stocks preferentially. Therefore, the research
object in this paper is investors who invest heavily in new stocks.3.3. Main observation variables: extraction of principal components of corporate governance
Following Xu et al. (2006), who extract an operating performance index as a reference, we use PCA to cal-
culate the principal components of comprehensive corporate governance, which are then used as the standard
in the following analysis. We extract three representative variables featuring board characteristic information
and three featuring equity structure information, two dimensions reﬂecting aﬃliation information, and one
variable featuring audit information on IPO prospectuses. These variables are sourced from the annual reports
issued one year before the IPOs, and act as representative indicators. The deﬁnitions of the variables and their
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
We reﬁne the nine explanatory variables on corporate governance information to construct a principal
component factor that shows the overall corporate governance conditions of new shares. For continuous vari-
ables such as BODSIZE, DEGREE_SEP, OR and LEVEL, we use conventional PCA to extract the principal
components. For the ﬁve other categorical variables, the PCA precondition that the variables to be extracted
are in a multivariate normal distribution is diﬃcult to meet. Therefore, the researchers perform data classiﬁ-
cation using CATPCA instead. That method can play the same function as ordinary PCA (Zhang et al., 2004).
In addition, it can not only eliminate any interaction between evaluation indexes, but also simpliﬁes the index
synthesis steps and then brieﬂy shows the relationship between corporate governance and investment strategy.
The synthesis process is illustrated in Table 2.
First, Panel A of Table 2 shows that the ﬁrst eigenvalue’s cumulative contribution rate to the continuous
and categorical variables, respectively, interprets 81.11% and 77.09% of the represented variables. Hence, it
can be used to express the optimal linear combination of the nine variables. Second, the variance contribution
rate is taken as a weight to construct the eigenvector, and the ﬁrst principal component of continuous variable
GOV_CTN1 and ﬁrst principal component of categorical variable GOV_DUM1 derived from PCA can be
identiﬁed as a comprehensive indicator of the corporate governance level.
The loading coeﬃcients (factor loadings) of GOV_CTN1 to the continuous variables are BODSIZE (0.197),
DEGREE_SEP (0.215), OR (0.234) and LEVEL (0.221), and those of GOV_DUM1 to the categorical
variables are LAW_INDIR (0.529), SAMECITY (0.263), SOE (0.365), PEER (0.243) and BIG_14
(0.460).
Panel B of Table 2 shows the directions of the coeﬃcients corresponding to the positive and
standardized nine governance information variables to be consistent with expectations. Therefore, we take
the ﬁrst principal component factor scores of the corporate governance continuous (GOV_CTN1) and -cate-
gorical (GOV_DUM1) variables as agent variables of corporate governance, and enter them in the selection
model.2 For example, when setting up new stock products, many funds commit themselves to increasing the probability of obtaining proﬁtable
new stocks. Accordingly, rational investors tend to screen IPO companies and select those of high quality to ensure higher returns rather
than aimlessly investing or casting a wide net.
3 The detailed descriptions of investment strategies and regular disclosure of investment lists on the Web sites of the main securities
investment funds provide some corporate governance information, such as board characteristics, ownership structure, company aﬃliation
and audit condition.
Table 1
Deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics of three categories of corporate governance.
Variable category Variable name Variable deﬁnition Mean Std. Lower quantile Median Upper quantile
Board
Characteristics
LAW_INDIR If the IPO company’s establishment of independent directors is
in accordance with CSRC requirements (the number of
independent directors is not less than two and the proportion is
not less than one-third), the variable equals 1, and is otherwise 0
0.933 0.352 1.000 1.000 1.000
SAMECITY If an independent director and the IPO company are in the
same city, the variable is equal to 1, and is otherwise 0. We
identify this variable using the independent director with a
ﬁnancial background. If there is more than one such
independent director, the others are regarded as located in
diﬀerent cities
0.345 0.510 0.000 0.000 1.000
BODSIZE IPO board size. We use the total number of directors (including
the chairperson) as an alternative agent variable
9.539 5.380 6.000 8.000 11.000
Ownership
Characteristics
SOE If the IPO company is state-owned (the controlling shareholder
is a state-owned enterprise or government agency), this variable
equals 1, and is otherwise 0
0.099 0.253 0.000 0.000 1.000
DEGREE_SEP This variable reﬂects the degree of separation and equals the
control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder minus its
ownership, which indicates the separation of the controlling
shareholder’s cash ﬂow and control rights
4.242 8.706 2.465 4.784 9.322
OR This variable is the equity ratio retained, which is equal to
company shares before the IPO divided by those after the IPO
0.627 0.203 0.427 0.576 0.818
Aﬃliation & Audit PEER If an IPO company and its parent ﬁrm are in the same industry,
this variable equals 1, and is otherwise 0
0.473 0.542 0.000 0.978 0.958
LEVEL This variable refers to the layers between the IPO company and
its ultimate controlling shareholder, and measures the
company’s control structure
1.860 1.064 1.000 2.000 2.000
BIG_14 If the IPO company’s prospectus is audited by one of the
international big four or domestic big ten, this variable is equal
to 1, and is otherwise 0
0.463 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000
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Table 2
Synthesis of three types of corporate governance indicators using multi-index evaluation information.
Continuous variables Dummy variables
Eigenvalue Value Covariance
contribution rate
Cumulative covariance
contribution rate
Eigenvalue Value Covariance
contribution rate
Cumulative covariance
contribution rate
PANEL A: Computed eigenvalues and contribution rates according to the covariance of weight multiplied and standardized data
k1 2.204 0.811 0.811 k1 2.724 0.771 0.771
k2 0.275 0.086 0.897 k2 0.284 0.099 0.870
k3 0.232 0.070 0.967 k3 0.236 0.070 0.940
k4 0.118 0.027 0.994 k4 0.140 0.051 0.991
k5 0.008 0.003 0.997 k5 0.032 0.005 0.996
k6 0.006 0.003 0.999
Principal component Expected direction
and process
GOV_CTN1 GOV_CTN2 GOV_DUM1 GOV_DUM2 GOV_DUM3
PANEL B: Computed eigenvector (PCA coeﬃcients) according to the covariance of weight multiplied and standardized data
Board LAW_INDIR + 0.529 0.248 0.099
SAMECITY  Positive 0.263 0.161 0.104
BODSIZE ? 0.197 0.093
Ownership SOE  Positive 0.365 0.128 0.218
DEGREE_SEP  Positive 0.215 0.115
OR + 0.234 0.227
AFFILI&AUDIT PEER  Positive 0.243 0.110 0.061
LEVEL  Positive 0.221 0.181
BIG_14 + 0.460 0.215 0.172
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After extracting the three types of principal components of the corporate governance information of IPO
corporations (GOVi), we regress the three indexes to the shareholding ratios of heterogeneous investors, the
listing exchange of new stocks and the bull-bear market cycle, as shown in Eq. (1).HLDP ¼ b0 þ b1GOV þ b2GOV  BULLþ b3BULL þ
X11
i¼1
b4jCONTROLVARS þ
X2
j¼1
b5jLISTEXG þ e ð1ÞIn Eq. (1), the dependent variable HLDP represents the shareholding ratios of diﬀerent types of investors. The
independent variable GOV represents both the ﬁrst principal component of the continuous corporate gover-
nance variable (GOV_DUM1) and that of the categorical corporate governance variable (GOV_CTN1).
Hypothesis 1 predicts the regression coeﬃcients of the GOV variables to be signiﬁcantly positive for the share-
holding ratio of institutional investors (blue-chip investors in particular); that is, b1 should be signiﬁcantly
positive. Further, to examine the eﬀect of the bull-bear market cycle on the relationship between the corporate
governance of IPO ﬁrms and institutional investors’ holding decisions, we include the principal components of
the two variables of corporate governance (GOV_DUM1 and GOV_CTN1) and the bull-bear cycle (BULL). If
the composite index of the host exchange (Shanghai or Shenzhen) is in an upward cycle when new stocks are
issued, then BULL equals 1; if it is in a downward phase, BULL equals 0. Hypothesis 2 predicts the coeﬃcient
of the product to be signiﬁcantly positive for the shareholding ratio of institutional investors (particularly
blue-chip investors); that is, b2 should be signiﬁcantly positive.
The deﬁnitions of the variables used in this research are presented in Table 3.
The control variables (CONTROL VARS) in Eq. (1) are chosen with reference to previous research and
China’s institutional background. They include IPO ﬁnancial information, which is directly related to the
investment decision (i.e., company size, capital structure and performance indicators), basic information
(i.e., company age before listing, reputation of underwriters and venture capital institution, and participation
of venture capital institution) and market information (i.e., excess subscription of new shares, ﬁrst-day turn-
over rate and industry boom index in new share listing month). In addition to these three categories of control
variables, we also control for ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e., the stock exchange on which new shares are listed).
First, with regard to the aforementioned ﬁnancial information, the scale of a company’s assets suggests the
scale of its economy, which has a positive eﬀect on rational investors (Shefrin and Statman, 1994; Lakonishok
et al., 1994), who are more willing to hold shares in large companies (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). In addi-
tion, the capital structure, namely, the debt level, reveals the extent of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial risk and ﬁnancial dis-
tress (Ohlson, 1980). Although the indicator of liabilities to assets has many defects, it is often used by rational
investors to select stock (Bushee, 2001) because the earnings response coeﬃcient of highly leveraged compa-
nies is signiﬁcantly lower than that of less-leveraged ﬁrms (Dhaliwal et al., 1991). The issuing price-to-earnings
ratio constitutes internal information used to estimate the IPO stock price, and therefore provides a pricing
channel. It plays an important role in guiding investment decisions. Prior studies have found that stocks in
public corporations with high proﬁt and growth levels are likely to be held by institutional investors with large
shareholdings (Gompers and Metrick, 2001).
Second, with regard to the basic information, the length of time between an IPO company’s establishment
and its listing date constitutes a special signal. Company age can aﬀect the future excess returns of IPO com-
panies. For those in mature industries, the longer the length of establishment before the listing, the higher the
level of market awareness. For IPO ﬁrms in industries such as Internet and new media, e-commerce, and new
energy or other emerging industries, however, growing rapidly and quickly passing the China Securities
Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) listing criteria are suggestive of a strong development tendency. Investors
can judge the information disclosed by the company’s age after considering its industry. Underwriter reputation
is an important factor that inﬂuences the success and performance of IPO companies (Carter and Manaster,
1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Cooney et al., 2003). We select underwriter performance to measure under-
writer reputation. Data on the amount of underwriting undertaken by a principal underwriter in the year before
an IPO are obtained from the CSIA Web site. If that amount puts him or her into the top 15 in the given
industry, then he or she is regarded as having a strong reputation, and UW_REPU = 1. The participation
Table 3
Deﬁnitions of main research variables.
Variable category Variable Variable deﬁnition
Dependent variables Institutional investors’
shareholding
P_INST Institutional investors’ shareholding in top 10 tradable
shareholders
Individual investors’
shareholding
P_INDI Individual investors’ shareholding in top 10 tradable shareholders
Blue-chip institutional
investors’ shareholding
P_WINNER Of the top 10 tradable shareholders, the institutional investors
whose shareholding returns in the previous year are larger than or
equal to the market return are deﬁned as blue-chip investors. The
shareholding ratio of these investors is designated P_WINNER
Underperforming
institutional investors’
shareholding
P_LOSER Of the top 10 tradable shareholders, the institutional investors
whose shareholding returns in the previous year are less than the
market return are deﬁned as underperforming institutions. Their
shareholding ratio is designated P_LOSER
Independent
variables
Corporate governance
comprehensive indexes
GOV_CTN1 The ﬁrst principal component of the continuous variable of
corporate governance computed via PCA
GOV_DUM1 The ﬁrst principal component of the dummy variable of corporate
governance computed via CATPCA
Moderator variable BULL If the composite index of the host exchange (Shanghai or Shenzhen)
is in an upward phase when new stocks are issued, the BULL equals
1; if it is in a downward phase, then BULL equals 0
Control variables LN_ASSET Natural logarithm of total assets disclosed in the annual report one
year before listing. It is used to control for possible size eﬀect
LEV Leverage disclosed in the pre-listing annual report, which is equal
to total debt divided by total assets. It is used to control the capital
structure factor
IPO_PE Price-earnings ratio, which is used to indicate the extent of the over-
or under-valuing of diﬀerent stock prices
PRELISTAGE Length of time in years from IPO company establishment to listing
date
UW_REPU If the underwriting experience of the principal underwriter in the
pre-listing year places it in the top 15 in the industry (data from
CSIA Web site and WIND), the variable equals 1, and otherwise 0
VC If a venture capital institution is listed as the main shareholder in
the IPO prospectus (data from Chinese Venture Capital Research
Institute), the variable equals 1, and otherwise 0
VC_SHARE Shareholding ratio of venture capital institution in prospectus (%)
PLOT_ONLN IPO excess purchase rate (reciprocal online success rate), which
indicates a subscription volume higher than the oﬀering volume
TNOV Turnover rate on the ﬁrst day
CLIMATE Industry boom index in the month new shares are listed. It is
manually constructed from the 21 sectors of the monthly economic
index released by the Industry Climate Monitoring Platform of the
Development Research Center of the State Council
LISTEXG IPO stock exchange. Shanghai stock exchange = 1; Shenzhen stock
exchange = 2
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the behavior and reputation of VC investors to varying degrees (Zhang and Liao, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Cai
et al., 2013). We adopt the approach of Coakley et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011). If VC institutions are listed
among the main shareholders in an IPO prospectus, we believe that VC investors participate in the ﬁrm.
Finally, with regard to the market information, the IPO excess purchase rate is indicative of online sub-
scription success, as it refers to the subscription volume being higher than the oﬀering volume. The ﬁrst-
day turnover rate indicates the presence of strong institutions, which has implications for assessing stock price
volatility. We also control for diﬀerences in industry boom. With reference to the CSRC’s 2001 ‘‘Listing
294 Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 283–304Corporation Industry Classiﬁcation Guidelines,” we obtain the industry boom index for each IPO company in
its listing month. We also add the stock listing exchange (LISTEXG) to our model as a ﬁxed-eﬀect variable to
reﬂect diﬀerences between the Shenzhen and Shanghai trading markets.4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 tabulates summary statistics for the variables used in our main analysis. Judging from the list of
investors who take a large holding in new stocks, institutional investors tend to have a larger ownership stake
than individual investors, averaging around 4.61% in our sample. Moreover, within the institutional investor
group, blue-chip investors have a larger ownership stake than their underperforming counterparts, which is
consistent with our expectations.
Descriptive statistics for the control variables are also presented in the table. The mean value of underwriter
reputation (UW_REPU) is 0.326, indicating that 32.62% of the sample ﬁrms recruit highly reputable under-
writers. The mean values of VC and VC_SHARE are 0.502 and 0.089, respectively, suggesting that VC insti-
tutions subscribe to only a few new stocks. Their holdings are 8.91% on average. The new ﬁrms in our sample
tend to have low ﬁnancial leverage ratios, averaging around 0.375. The mean value of CLIMATE is 103.210,
which is expected as new ﬁrms always list in a bull market. The other variables are within normal ranges.
Table 5 reports the correlations between the ownership stakes of the two institutional investor groups and
the explanatory variable, i.e., corporate governance. The Pearson correlations are on the bottom left, and the
Spearman correlations in the upper right. Consistent with our hypothesis, the ownership stakes of institutional
investors and blue-chip investors, P_INST and P_WINNER, are strongly and positively correlated with the
two proxies for corporate governance. In contrast, P_INDI is negatively correlated with both independent
variables, and the correlation between P_LOSER and GOV_CTN1 (GOV_DUM1) is unstable, providing pre-
liminary support for our hypothesis that underperforming institutional investors do not make eﬀective use of
corporate governance information.4.2. Group testing of investor heterogeneity and new stock subscription behavior
Panel A of Table 6 divides the full sample into two groups by both the value of corporate governance
and investor heterogeneity. The horizontal axis distinguishes the sample by the median of GOV_CTN1 andTable 4
Descriptive statistics of the main variables.
Variable N Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3
Dependent Variables P_INST 1516 0.084 0.131 0.007 0.031 0.111
P_INDI 1516 0.038 0.033 0.018 0.033 0.052
P_WINNER 1516 0.070 0.110 0.006 0.029 0.085
P_LOSER 1516 0.041 0.069 0.010 0.027 0.050
Independent Variables GOV_DUM1 1516 1.107 0.819 0.539 0.939 1.517
GOV_CTN1 1516 1.014 0.911 0.621 1.193 1.735
Controls UW_REPU 1516 0.326 0.081 0.000 0.000 1.000
VC 1516 0.502 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000
VC_SHARE 1516 0.089 0.307 0.015 0.094 0.138
LN_ASSET 1516 20.412 1.635 17.402 19.455 24.303
LEV 1516 0.375 0.371 0.331 0.403 0.662
IPO_P/E 1516 19.530 20.190 13.975 51.220 26.185
PRELISTAGE 1516 8.766 8.083 3.972 7.811 11.015
CLIMATE 1516 103.210 5.232 100.241 103.208 110.274
PLOT_ONLN 1516 1.521 0.098 0.475 1.350 1.718
TNOV 1516 0.720 0.008 0.623 0.731 0.901
Table 5
Correlation matrices.
P_INST P_INDI P_WINNER P_LOSER GOV_CTN1 GOV_DUM1
P_INST 1 0.439*** 0.721*** 0.167*** 0.079*** 0.184***
P_INDI 0.056** 1 0.270*** 0.281*** 0.270*** 0.024
P_WINNER 0.492*** 0.080*** 1 0.130*** 0.002*** 0.063**
P_LOSER 0.746*** 0.015 0.064** 1 0.098*** 0.093***
GOV_CTN1 0.085*** 0.241*** 0.080*** 0.04 1 0.578***
GOV_DUM1 0.179*** 0.077*** 0.026** 0.069** 0.682*** 1
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descend a signiﬁcant 2.11% from high GOV_CTN1 to low GOV_CTN1, indicating a positive relationship
between corporate governance and investors’ decisions. In contrast, the change in the mean values of the
P_INDI measure from high to low governance is not signiﬁcant, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1a.
We repeat the group testing using the ﬁrst principal component of the dummy variable GOV_DUM1, and
the results are basically consistent with the foregoing conclusion.
Furthermore, we also compare the two types of institutional investors, as shown in Panel B of Table 6. It
can be seen that blue-chip investors hold more stock in newly listed ﬁrms with high GOV_CTN1 and
GOV_DUM1 values than their underperforming counterparts and tend to avoid new ﬁrms with low such
values, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1b.
4.3. Multivariate analyses
Table 7 reports the empirical results for Hypothesis 1. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (3) is
P_INST, whereas that in Columns (2) and (4) is P_INDI. The explanatory variables are GOV_CTN1 and
GOV_DUM1, respectively.
Without considering the eﬀect of bull and bear cycles, the estimated coeﬃcients on GOV_CTN1 and
GOV_DUM1 are signiﬁcantly positive in the ﬁrst model in Table 7, indicating that newly listed ﬁrms with bet-
ter corporate governance tend to attract more institutional investors. In the second model considering the
shareholding of individual investors, however, the coeﬃcient of GOV_CTN1 lacks signiﬁcance and that of
GOV_DUM1 is positive only at the 10% signiﬁcance level. These results are in line with our expectation
and support Hypothesis 1a.
We next include the interaction item for market cycle and the two principal components of corporate gov-
ernance. For institutional investors, the coeﬃcient of GOV_CTN1*BULL in column (3) lacks signiﬁcance and
that of GOV_DUM1*BULL is positive only at the 10% signiﬁcance level, indicating that institutional investorsTable 6
Shareholdings of heterogeneous investors in new ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of corporate governance.
Grouped by Share Number Grouped by Share Number
PANEL A: Ownership of individual and institutional investors
INST High GOV_CTN1 0.095 4.272 Low GOV_CTN1 0.074 3.845
High GOV_DUM1 0.087 4.155 Low GOV_DUM1 0.077 3.964
INDI High GOV_CTN1 0.041 5.785 Low GOV_CTN1 0.035 6.133
High GOV_DUM1 0.039 5.854 Low GOV_DUM1 0.038 6.062
PANEL B: Ownership of blue-chip and underperforming institutional investors
WINNER High GOV_CTN1 0.077 4.434 Low GOV_CTN1 0.063 3.815
High GOV_DUM1 0.072 4.168 Low GOV_DUM1 0.06 4.088
LOSER High GOV_CTN1 0.016 4.184 Low GOV_CTN1 0.018 4.075
High GOV_DUM1 0.017 3.905 Low GOV_DUM1 0.016 4.361
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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ent when it comes to individual investors. As shown in column (4), the coeﬃcients of GOV_CTN1*BULL and
GOV_DUM1*BULL are 0.007 and 0.002 at signiﬁcance levels of 10% and 1%, respectively, thus conﬁrm-
ing Hypothesis 1b.
The results for the control variables are also consistent with our expectations. For instance, the estimated
coeﬃcients on LN_ASSET are signiﬁcantly positive, which indicates that large ﬁrms supported by VC are bet-
ter received by institutional investors because of those ﬁrms’ reputational capital. The coeﬃcients on LEV are
not consistent in the diﬀerent models, indicating that the inﬂuence of leverage may be conditional.
We now seek to explain the relationship between corporate governance and the behavior of investors with
diﬀerent historical performance records. Table 8 presents the regression estimates of those investors proxied byTable 7
The inﬂuence of corporate governance on new stock selection.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
P_INST P_INDI P_INST P_INDI
GOV_CTN1 0.003*** 0.001 0.003** 0.006
(2.78) (1.04) (2.02) (1.24)
GOV_DUM1 0.012** 0.002* 0.015** 0.001*
(2.15) (1.93) (2.33) (1.82)
BULL 0.007** 0.003***
(2.31) (3.55)
GOV_CTN1*BULL 0.003 0.007*
(1.46) (1.72)
GOV_DUM1*BULL 0.003* 0.002***
(1.80) (3.35)
LN_ASSET 0.035*** 0.001 0.036*** 0.001
(6.26) (0.15) (6.43) (0.19)
LEV 0.042* 0.022 0.049* 0.019
(1.78) (1.26) (1.82) (1.05)
IPO_PE 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.88) (0.94) (0.72) (0.85)
PRELISTAGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.19) (0.14) (0.40) (0.19)
UW_REPU 0.041** 0.018 0.042** 0.018
(2.18) (1.42) (2.24) (1.40)
VC 0.103*** 0.027** 0.108*** 0.030**
(5.64) (2.22) (5.84) (2.40)
VC_SHARE 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.003***
(0.70) (2.80) (0.64) (2.92)
TURNOVER 0.002 0.016*** 0.000 0.016***
(0.29) (4.23) (0.035) (4.19)
CONSTANT 0.808*** 0.342*** 0.797*** 0.364***
(4.84) (3.05) (4.68) (3.18)
IND & LISTEXG Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516
Adj. R2 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.12
Subsample test on the coeﬃcient of (1) VS (2) (3) VS (4)
GOV_CTN1 GOV_CTN1*BULL
Chi2(1) = 7.05 Chi2(1) = 3.05
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0121 Prob > Chi2 = 0.1102
GOV_DUM1 GOV_DUM1*BULL
Chi2(1) = 3.80 Chi2(1) = 4.46
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0781 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0346
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 8
Inﬂuence of corporate governance on investors with diﬀerent levels of investment performance.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
P_WINNER P_LOSER P_WINNER P_LOSER
GOV_CTN1 0.005** 0.004 0.002* 0.004
(2.51) (1.15) (1.93) (1.00)
GOV_DUM1 0.017*** 0.003 0.025*** 0.002
(2.88) (1.17) (2.73) (1.49)
BULL 0.008*** 0.008***
(2.80) (2.92)
GOV_CTN1*BULL 0.002 0.003*
(0.33) (1.78)
GOV_DUM1*BULL 0.007 0.002**
(1.07) (2.31)
LN_ASSET 0.036*** 0.005 0.037*** 0.006
(6.38) (1.30) (6.43) (1.53)
LEV 0.067** 0.037** 0.074*** 0.032*
(2.47) (2.14) (2.69) (1.87)
IPO_PE 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001
(0.44) (1.72) (0.26) (1.64)
PRELISTAGE 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.65) (0.19) (0.80) (0.064)
UW_REPU 0.040** 0.011 0.041** 0.011
(2.10) (0.93) (2.14) (0.93)
VC 0.051*** 0.077*** 0.055*** 0.081***
(2.72) (6.50) (2.91) (6.72)
VC_SHARE 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.002**
(0.61) (2.40) (0.57) (2.52)
TURNOVER 0.006 0.008** 0.006 0.007*
(1.10) (2.20) (0.95) (1.90)
CONSTANT 1.006*** 0.234** 1.016*** 0.235**
(5.85) (2.16) (5.79) (2.13)
IND & LISTEXG Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516
Adj. R2 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.19
Subsample test on the coeﬃcient of (1) VS (2) (3) VS (4)
GOV_CTN1 GOV_CTN1*BULL
Chi2(1) = 5.05 Chi2(1) = 2.86
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0400 Prob > Chi2 = 0.1590
GOV_DUM1 GOV_DUM1*BULL
Chi2(1) = 8.12 Chi2(1) = 3.92
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0112 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0721
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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GOV_DUM1 to be signiﬁcantly positive below 5% and 1%, respectively (t-statistics = 2.51 and 2.88,
respectively).
After controlling for bull and bear cycles, we observe the inﬂuence of the market environment on investor
behavior. Both GOV_CTN1*BULL and GOV_CTN1*BULL are more signiﬁcantly negative in column (4)
than in column (3), indicating that the market environment is negatively associated with the rationality of
underperforming institutional investors relative to their blue-chip counterparts, which is consistent with
Hypothesis 2b.
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with large holdings make more eﬀective use of corporate governance information. Similarly, compared with
their underperforming counterparts, blue-chip institutional investors also make better use of such informa-
tion. Furthermore, bull and bear markets exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the behavior of both individual inves-
tors and underperforming institutional investors.5. Extended research
The diﬀerences between individual and institutional investors are obvious, but the classiﬁcations of institu-
tional investors diﬀer. In expanded testing, we change the classiﬁcation criteria for the ability of institutional
investors. We ﬁrst consider large holding experience instead of historical investment performance, and we thenTable 9
Eﬀects of corporate governance on institutional investors with large holding experience when they make large investment decisions about
IPO stocks.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
P_VETERAN P_GREEN P_VETERAN P_GREEN
GOV_CTN1 0.006*** 0.001** 0.009*** 0.002**
(3.16) (2.30) (3.81) (2.09)
GOV_DUM1 0.013** 0.002 0.017** 0.003
(2.01) (1.28) (2.43) (1.49)
BULL 0.015** 0.003*
(2.12) (1.82)
GOV_CTN1*BULL 0.001 0.013***
(0.41) (3.05)
GOV_DUM1*BULL 0.003 0.007***
(1.01) (2.51)
LN_ASSET 0.055*** 0.020*** 0.056*** 0.020***
(8.91) (11.8) (9.10) (11.7)
LEV 0.056* 0.036*** 0.066** 0.036***
(1.89) (4.52) (2.21) (4.41)
IPO_PE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(1.45) (0.31) (1.24) (0.30)
PRELISTAGE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.68) (1.56) (0.90) (1.56)
UW_REPU 0.057*** 0.001 0.059*** 0.001
(2.74) (0.26) (2.82) (0.13)
VC 0.121*** 0.009* 0.129*** 0.009*
(5.94) (1.68) (6.25) (1.65)
VC_SHARE 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.99) (0.28) (1.12) (0.28)
TURNOVER 0.013** 0.005*** 0.011* 0.005***
(2.01) (2.93) (1.69) (2.96)
CONSTANT 1.511*** 0.361*** 1.508*** 0.346***
(8.11) (7.12) (7.96) (6.70)
IND & LISTEXG Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516
Adj. R2 0.34 0.21 0.35 0.22
Subsample test on the coeﬃcient of (1) VS (2) (3) VS (4)
GOV_CTN1 GOV_CTN1*BULL
Chi2(1) = 2.70 Chi2(1) = 4.71
Prob > Chi2 = 0.1006 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0270
GOV_DUM1 GOV_DUM1*BULL
Chi2(1) = 4.92 Chi2(1) = 5.31
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0266 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0306
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main regression conclusions hold.
5.1. Reclassifying institutional investors according to large holding experience
We ﬁrst compare the top 10 tradable shareholders of IPO companies with those of the companies a year
before their IPO. We then sort the listed companies held by institutions with large holdings who invest heavily
in new stocks, ranking them from high to low. Next, we choose the top 10% as ‘‘institutions with rich large
holding experience” (VETERAN) and the bottom 10% as ‘‘institutions lacking large holding experience”
(GREEN). Finally, using this new classiﬁcation method, we reexamine the ability of diﬀerent types of
institutional investors to make use of corporate governance information. The results are presented in
Table 9.
As can be seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9, the higher the level of corporate governance, the larger the
shareholding of institutions with rich experience. Columns (3) and (4) show that when the bull-bear cycle vari-
able and its cross term with the corporate governance variables are added, the regression coeﬃcients of the
cross terms between the corporate governance principal components (GOV_CTN1, GOV_DUM1) and BULL
are signiﬁcantly negative in the group with a lack of large holding experience. The implication is that investors
with little such experience make little use of corporate governance information on IPO corporations in a bull
market environment, thus further highlighting the informational advantage of institutional investors with
considerable large holding experience in the IPO context, particularly in the up phase of a stock market
index.
To further test the robustness of the regression results, the classiﬁcation standards are adjusted in two ways.
First, we relax the classiﬁcation criteria. More speciﬁcally, we quarter the number of listed companies in which
institutions were once heavily invested, and then take the median (MEDIAN = once held large shares of three
other listed companies) and upper quartile (P75 = once held large shares of at least four other listed compa-
nies) as the classiﬁcation standard for ‘‘institutional investors with rich large holding experience.” Second, we
tighten the classiﬁcation standard. More speciﬁcally, we rank the listed companies once heavily held by insti-
tutions from high to low, and then take the top 5% (P95 = once held large shares of at least seven other listed
companies) as the classiﬁcation standard. The results are basically consistent with those discussed above.
5.2. Reclassifying institutional investors by economic laws and regulations
Most studies classify institutional investors by economic laws and regulations and are concerned purely
with the study of securities investment funds, although a few studies compare such funds with securities com-
panies or social insurance funds or with securities companies and the QFII scheme, and there are also a few
comparing securities investment funds, securities companies, the QFII scheme and trust companies. In
extended testing, we investigate the application of governance information on IPO corporations by diﬀerent
institutional investors classiﬁed on the basis of economic laws and regulations.
Table 10 presents the results of testing the relationship between the shareholding ratios of institutional inves-
tors classiﬁed by economic laws and regulations and accounting information quality. Restricted by the law and
investment environment, the number of samples in each column diﬀers. Except for securities investment funds
and common legal institutions, the holdings of listed companies by other institutional investors are limited. The
test results are as follows. (1) According to the two principal component variables of corporate governance
(GOV_CTN1, GOV_DUM1), the shareholdings of securities investment funds, social insurance funds, trust
companies and QFII ﬁrms are all signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the corporate governance variables.
In contrast, the positive relationship between those variables and the shareholding of common legal institutions
is relatively weak, probably because the trading strategies of such institutions are stable and they keep in close
contact with IPO companies. The shareholding of insurance companies is negatively correlated with the
corporate governance variables, probably because these companies often have business aﬃliations with the
target companies. (2) From the cross terms of the two principal component variables of corporate governance
with the bull-bear cycle (GOV_CTN1*BULL, GOV_DUM1*BULL), it can be seen that the relationship
between institutional investors’ shareholding and the corporate governance variables is not negatively aﬀected
Table 10
Eﬀects of corporate governance on institutional investors of diﬀerent economic natures when they make large investment decisions on IPO stocks.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LOF General corporate Insurance company Social security fund Trust company QFII
GOV_CTN1 0.014** 0.017** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002*** 0.003** 0.004* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003*
(2.14) (2.22) (1.53) (1.62) (1.48) (1.35) (2.73) (2.02) (1.93) (1.72) (2.08) (1.95)
GOV_DUM1 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.000 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004* 0.005**
(3.24) (2.61) (1.79) (1.76) (0.58) (0.28) (2.11) (2.21) (2.18) (2.11) (1.98) (2.04)
BULL 0.002*** 0.005 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.004
(3.33) (0.42) (0.76) (2.28) (2.13) (0.65)
GOV_CTN1*BULL 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.015* 0.004
(1.03) (1.33) (0.73) (1.12) (1.67) (0.51)
GOV_DUM1*BULL 0.002* 0.005 0.000 0.002** 0.005 0.006*
(1.87) (0.45) (0.12) (2.40) (0.58) (1.75)
LN_ASSET 0.022*** 0.002 0.014** 0.015** 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.002
(4.00) (0.82) (2.29) (2.36) (0.54) (0.40) (1.17) (1.07) (2.86) (2.64) (0.48) (0.54)
LEV 0.002 0.001 0.046 0.048 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.005
(0.13) (0.068) (1.56) (1.62) (0.79) (0.86) (1.04) (0.84) (0.79) (0.65) (0.58) (0.40)
IPO_PE 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.54) (0.63) (2.55) (2.55) (0.89) (0.99) (0.53) (0.68) (0.96) (1.02) (1.68) (1.53)
PRELISTAGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.098) (0.069) (0.54) (0.54) (0.33) (0.35) (0.55) (0.54) (0.67) (0.60) (2.80) (2.52)
UW_REPU 0.023** 0.023** 0.021 0.020 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.022 0.005 0.005
(2.02) (1.97) (1.00) (0.96) (0.13) (0.14) (0.32) (0.28) (1.34) (1.51) (0.57) (0.57)
VC 0.005 0.004 0.026 0.029 0.009** 0.009** 0.002 0.003 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.59) (0.37) (1.31) (1.45) (2.30) (2.22) (0.45) (0.66) (4.43) (4.14) (2.08) (2.08)
VC_SHARE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001*
(1.24) (1.02) (0.90) (0.85) (0.80) (0.71) (2.36) (2.45) (0.20) (0.025) (1.72) (1.80)
TURNOVER 0.001 0.001 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.44) (0.38) (3.22) (3.23) (0.57) (0.52) (0.65) (0.77) (0.71) (0.85) (0.13) (0.074)
CONSTANT 0.073 0.075 0.098 0.275 0.020 0.023 0.081** 0.065** 0.278*** 0.259*** 0.072 0.077
(1.08) (1.08) (0.72) (1.50) (0.89) (0.92) (2.51) (2.34) (3.24) (3.06) (1.54) (1.55)
IND & LISTEXG Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 1225 1225 1516 1516 240 240 392 392 267 267 169 169
Adj. R2 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.28 0.28 0.43 0.43 0.61 0.61
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Z. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 283–304 301by a bull market cycle. The implication is that institutional investors pay close attention to corporate
governance information even in the upward phase of a stock index, which is quite consistent with the results
in Table 7.
6. Conclusions and implications
An IPO is not only a process that improves a ﬁrm’s corporate governance level; it is also a process that
provides investors with useful information. It is generally believed that a boom in new stock investment pos-
sibilities renders it diﬃcult for the market to ascertain the real value of IPO companies, and thus triggers irra-
tional investor behavior. The consequences are reﬂected in capital investment behavior, with investors often
overestimating the initial returns on new stocks. However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in investor
capacity and performance. Do all investors really choose new stocks irrationally? Does mindless investment
exist in the IPO market? The theoretical analyses and empirical tests described in this paper are carried out
to ﬁnd answers to these questions.
Our study sample incudes all IPO companies in China that went public between 20 May 2002 and 31
December 2014. We use the PCA method to extract corporate governance characteristics, and compare the
use of corporate governance information by diverse investors with large holding experience when they sub-
scribe to new stocks. The empirical results show the following. First, compared with individual investors, insti-
tutional investors make greater use of corporate governance information. Second, there are signiﬁcant
variations in the use of such information by institutional investors. Compared with underperforming institu-
tional investors, blue-chip institutional investors make more eﬀective use of corporate governance informa-
tion. Third, in the up phase of a stock index, the use of such information by both individual investors and
underperforming institutional investors declines signiﬁcantly. However, the bull-bear cycle exerts little inﬂu-
ence on the use of corporate governance information by blue-chip institutional investors.
This paper enriches the literature on China’s IPO market. The ﬁndings help us to better understand the
behavioral characteristics of investors in the process of selecting new stocks, and shed light on how to optimize
the allocation of social funds in the capital market, both of which are of theoretical and practical signiﬁcance.
The paper can serve as a reference for China’s reform of its IPO issuance and supervision system, and provide
suggestions for IPO ﬁrms seeking long-term development. It can also provide support for investors looking to
take advantage of corporate governance information to improve the eﬃciency of their new stock subscription
activities. IPO companies need to be aware of the importance of such information in the capital markets, and
improve their governance structures accordingly. To attract more institutional investors with large holdings,
thereby supporting their long-term development, these ﬁrms need to establish a reasonable board structure,
hire an accounting ﬁrm with an international reputation, optimize their ownership structure and develop
an internal control system. In terms of theory, this study shows the value of focusing on investors with large
holdings and investigating the relationship between external behavior and internal decision-making in the new
stock subscription process.
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Appendix A
See Table A1.
Table A1
Distribution of abnormal main fund movements in bull and bear markets.
Shenzhen composite index Shanghai composite index
Top Bottom Up phase Event Down phase Event Top Bottom Up phase Event Down phase Event
(Date/
Index)
(Date/
Index)
(Date/Change
rate)
(Firm) (Date/Change
rate)
(Firm) (Date/
Index)
(Date/
Index)
(Date/Change
rate)
(Firm) (Date/Change
rate)
(Firm)
Begin 2002/5/20 – – Begin 2002/5/20 – –
3041.4 1541.53
2004/4/7 2005/12/9 688 2 611 50 2004/4/9 2005/6/3 690 138 420 46
4146.45 2678.78 36.33% 35.40% 1783.01 998.23 15.66% 44.01%
2007/10/17 2007/11/29 677 127 43 12 2007/6/1 2007/7/9 728 25 38 1
19203.11 15189.4 616.86% 20.90% 4335.96 3563.54 334.36% 17.81%
2008/1/14 2008/11/7 46 14 298 71 2007/10/19 2008/10/30 102 6 377 12
18955.5 5598.21 24.79% 70.47% 6124.04 1664.93 71.85% 72.81%
2009/7/27 2009/9/1 262 3 36 10 2009/7/31 2009/9/30 274 3 61 2
13465.72 10387.42 140.54% 22.86% 3454.02 2712.3 107.46% 21.47%
2009/12/10 2010/7/2 100 57 204 183 2009/11/27 2010/6/22 58 2 207 18
13763.63 8945.2 32.50% 35.01% 3096.26 2313.1 14.16% 25.29%
2010/11/3 2011/12/27 124 101 419 293 2010/11/3 2012/1/5 134 8 764 44
13388.37 8692.38 49.67% 35.08% 3030.99 2148.452 31.04% 33.05%
2012/5/3 2012/12/5 128 60 216 75 2012/5/4 2012/12/6 120 11 216 15
10400.32 7782.68 19.65% 25.17% 2452.014 2029.24 14.13% 17.24%
2013/2/6 2013/6/25 63 0 139 0 2013/2/22 2013/6/14 78 0 112 0
9884.13 7045.6 27.00% 28.72% 2314.16 2162.04 14.04% 6.57%
2013/11/29 2014/7/17 157 1 230 47 2013/12/10 2014/3/6 179 0 86 7
8542.608 7194.744 21.25% 15.78% 2237.49 2059.58 3.49% 7.95%
2014/12/31 End 167 35 – – 2014/12/31 End 300 37 – –
11014.624 53.09% 3234.677 57.06%
Total – 400 – 741 Total – 230 – 145
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